By Abraham Nelson

March 29, 2026

I. Introduction & Problem Definition

For years, federal and state regulators have endeavored to address fraud in the cryptocurrency industry, with state attorneys general (AGs) taking an increasingly prominent role in that effort.¹ While state AGs wield differing powers, many possess authority positioning them to tackle illegality in this space, including the ability to enforce civil fraud, consumer protection, and securities laws.² However, while there is abundant research about federal digital asset regulation, information regarding state AGs’ ability to root out cryptocurrency fraud is scattered and incomplete. This dearth of pointed guidance is problematic because, as discussed below, the federal government is actively scaling back enforcement in the digital asset space. Thus, this paper seeks to identify ways that state AGs can fill the enforcement gap that may emerge as federal oversight evolves.

Virtual currency scams rake in billions of dollars annually, with fraudsters netting a reported $9.3 billion from U.S. targets in 2024 alone.³ Members of marginalized groups are particularly impacted. For instance, in 2024 the FBI received over 33,000 cryptocurrency-related complaints from seniors, amounting to over $2.8 billion in losses—both figures far exceeding any other age group.⁴ Further, research suggests that Black and Latino Americans are disproportionately likely to own cryptocurrency and to be victims of digital scams.⁵ Simply put, there is a growing problem of predatory activity in the cryptocurrency space that is particularly threatening to marginalized communities.

There are multiple inherent reasons why deceptive practices proliferate in the digital asset industry. For background, “‘crypto’ usually refers to the entire universe of technologies that involve blockchains”—a decentralized, open-source technology capable of creating permanent digital records of transactions, which are typically conducted anonymously.⁶ In practice, the term commonly refers to “coins” or “tokens”—virtual currencies issued by firms that are sold or transferred on “exchanges” using blockchain.⁷ Crucially, unlike the conventional financial system, transactions generally occur without intermediaries and easily cross borders, enabling con artists around the world to lure victims into scams outside the immediate reach of U.S. authorities.⁸

Beyond cryptocurrency’s decentralized, anonymous, and unsupervised nature, the industry is rife with conflicts of interest. Unlike traditional financial institutions, single entities or individuals can perform multiple interrelated roles.⁹ For example, weak structural separation fueled FTX’s collapse as Sam Bankman-Fried operated both that exchange and a hedge fund, which allowed him to funnel billions from the former into the latter.¹⁰ All told, while virtual currency firms are not inherently duplicitous, conditions that facilitate fraud are baked into the sector.

Despite cryptocurrency’s novelty, the problems described above are largely “old-school frauds with some crypto sauce poured on top.”¹¹ For instance, scammers run decentralized Ponzi schemes by luring in victims, many of whom are novice investors, with the prospect of profiting from innovative technology.¹² Similarly, the sector is plagued by pump-and-dump scams—where fraudsters drive up an asset’s value with deceptive claims before liquidating their positions when it reaches a certain price—which “are not new, nor somehow unique to digital assets.”¹³

In response to familiar issues, regulators initially turned to “enforcement on a case-by-case basis.”¹⁴ For instance, Gurbir Grewal, a former Director of the Division of Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), noted that his team’s digital asset-related work at the agency often entailed tackling “straight rips, Ponzi schemes, affinity frauds, or other types of scams.”¹⁵ In other words, despite unique challenges posed by a decentralized technology operating with minimal oversight, regulators have been able to use existing tools to mitigate fraud in the cryptocurrency industry.

That paradigm has shifted. In January 2025, President Trump issued an executive order that, among other things, created the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets comprising relevant federal agencies tasked with “propos[ing] a regulatory framework governing . . . digital assets.”¹⁶ The Working Group ultimately released a report heralding an end to an “aggressive strategy of regulation by enforcement,” while recommending around 100 policy and legislative actions on topics ranging from establishing a framework for digital asset market structure to countering illicit finance.¹⁷ Moreover, various moves—such as the SEC scaling back or outright dropping at least 60% of the cryptocurrency-related lawsuits that were pending when President Trump began his second term—suggest that the administration is heeding cryptocurrency industry leaders’ calls to reduce federal enforcement.¹⁸ Similarly, legislative developments reflect alignment with industry priorities, including the enactment of the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act), which regulates stablecoins (a kind of token that is pegged to the value of U.S. currency), and the House of Representatives’ passage of the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act (Clarity Act), which would regulate a broader swath of digital assets.¹⁹ The uncertainty arising from this shifting terrain underscores the need to consider state regulators’ capabilities and options for adaptation.

That is precisely what this paper aims to do, with an emphasis on state AGs. Section II briefly details the transition of federal cryptocurrency fraud enforcement from the aggressive use of existing securities and commodities laws by the SEC and the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to police illicit conduct in the virtual currency sector, to the budding creation of a novel rules-based order developed in partnership with cryptocurrency industry actors. Next, Section III reviews state-level digital asset regulation. In so doing, it highlights how state entities, including state AGs, complement federal agencies in addressing securities fraud. That section also presents the New York State Office of the Attorney General (NYAG) as a case study in using securities and consumer protection laws to target digital asset fraud. Next, Section IV discusses other approaches—namely unfair and deceptive acts and practices laws, multistate coalitions, lawsuits challenging federal regulatory regimes, the bully pulpit, and state legislative advocacy—that state AGs can use to respond to the emerging virtual currency enforcement gap. Finally, Section V concludes the paper by identifying future research opportunities.

II. The Shifting Federal Cryptocurrency Regulatory Framework

Cryptocurrency fraud enforcement has long been inextricably tied to a debate over whether most virtual currencies are “securities, commodities, or some other form of asset.”²⁰ The answer to that question has industry-wide ramifications because it determines whether most tokens fall under the ambit of the SEC, which polices securities fraud, or the CFTC, which regulates derivatives markets.²¹ For years, definitional uncertainty fostered long-running competition between the SEC and CFTC to be the primary digital asset enforcer.²² However, the shape of the cryptocurrency classification debate has changed as the Trump administration seeks to move from regulating virtual currencies through enforcement of existing laws to creating a comprehensive federal digital asset regulatory framework.

A. SEC and CFTC Cryptocurrency Enforcement Under the Biden Administration

Gary Gensler, who served as SEC Chair under President Biden, contended that “of nearly 10,000 tokens in the crypto market . . . the vast majority are securities. Offers and sales of these thousands of crypto security tokens are covered under the securities laws” and are thus regulatable by the SEC.²³ The agency reached that determination using a test adopted in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., where the Supreme Court held that a financial product is an investment contract, and thus a security under the Securities Act of 1933, if “the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with [the expectation of] profits to come solely from the efforts of others.”²⁴ Courts have construed the Howey test broadly, finding that numerous offerings qualify as an investment contract (i.e., a security), including those related to “whiskey, cosmetics, self-improvement courses . . . and even cattle embryos.”²⁵

Accordingly, during the Biden administration, courts regularly found that virtual currencies are securities.²⁶ That said, as with all potential investment contracts, the determination depends on the nature of the transaction, not the underlying instrument itself. As such, at least during that period, courts were more likely to find that direct cryptocurrency sales to institutional investors satisfy Howey, while sales in secondary markets (i.e., cryptocurrency exchanges) were less certain.²⁷ Regardless, former SEC Chair Gensler confidently asserted that almost all digital assets satisfy the Howey test since “the investing public is buying or selling crypto security tokens because they’re expecting profits derived from the efforts of others in a common enterprise.”²⁸

A core implication of the SEC’s regulatory posture during the Biden administration was that the bulk of digital asset firms transacting in tokens should be subject to the agency’s stringent regulations.²⁹ Particularly, per the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, companies that issue securities, as well as exchanges and broker-dealers, must adhere to strict rules—including registration, disclosure, and oversight requirements—which are designed to ensure investors have the information necessary to make informed investment decisions, while ensuring that regulated entities implement internal controls and are not engaged in financial malfeasance.³⁰ Similarly, to avoid conflicts of interest, interrelated business functions generally must be separated.³¹ Taken together, the SEC’s registration, structural separation, and oversight requirements impose “essential layers of protection for investors.”³²

The Biden administration’s SEC regularly encouraged cryptocurrency firms transacting in tokens deemed securities to register with the agency, while pursuing a regulatory crackdown on cryptocurrency fraud.³³ Notably, it initiated 125 cryptocurrency-related enforcement actions, 66% of which involved fraud allegations, and imposed $6.05 billion in penalties.³⁴ All told, while most digital asset firms did not register with the SEC,³⁵ the agency proved itself capable of zeroing in on fraud in the sector.

No less confident, the CFTC has asserted that its authority under the Commodity Exchange Act “extends to futures and swaps contracts in any commodity . . . [including] [d]erivative contracts based on a virtual currency.”³⁶ This interpretation, which lumps digital assets in with an enormous array of exchangeable products, has been validated by multiple federal courts.³⁷ Indeed, even former SEC Chair Gensler acknowledged that at least some digital assets (namely Bitcoin) are commodities if, unlike almost every other token, they lack a central issuer.³⁸

The CFTC’s role in overseeing virtual currencies is more constrained than the SEC’s because commodities are not subject to the same level of regulatory scrutiny as securities, and “the CFTC’s authority in spot markets is limited to enforcing prohibitions on fraud and manipulation.”³⁹ Accordingly, during the Biden administration, the agency’s relatively narrow scope, combined with its small size and limited resources, may have hampered its ability to detect digital asset scams.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the CFTC initiated at least 95 digital asset-related enforcement actions from 2021–2024, many of which involved fraud allegations.⁴¹ In so doing, the agency ultimately secured significant monetary relief from digital asset firms, including around $15.5 billion in restitution, disgorgement, and civil penalties in fiscal year 2024 alone.⁴² (While the Biden administration’s CFTC secured a significantly higher total amount of penalties in digital asset cases than the SEC did during the same time frame, the vast majority came from just two enforcement actions—one against FTX, and the other against Binance.)⁴³ Overall, despite limitations, the CFTC has proven to be a key federal cryptocurrency fraud enforcer.

B. Evolving Federal Digital Asset Enforcement Under the Trump Administration

In stark contrast, rather than relying on existing legal tools, the Trump administration has favored collaborating with industry actors to establish a comprehensive federal cryptocurrency regulatory framework. Indeed, from the outset, President Trump signaled an intent to give the CFTC a primary role in virtual currency oversight.⁴⁴ This is a boon to industry leaders, who have generally advocated for this outcome, viewing the comparatively small CFTC as more lax than the SEC.⁴⁵ Similarly, despite this perception, the SEC began radically altering its regulatory posture in the early days of the Trump administration, with SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce launching a task force aimed at orienting the agency away from former SEC Chair Gensler’s stringent approach.⁴⁶ This news was “cheered by those in the crypto world, some of whom refer to SEC Commissioner Peirce as ‘crypto mom.’”⁴⁷ Such reactions were validated when the SEC dropped numerous enforcement actions, including those against major cryptocurrency exchanges Coinbase, Binance, and Gemini.⁴⁸

The Trump administration’s regulatory overhaul has thus far entailed proposals to narrow the SEC’s jurisdiction over cryptocurrency. Specifically, the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets has endorsed a taxonomy categorizing digital assets as securities, commodities, or tokens for commercial and consumer use.⁴⁹ To that end, the working group called on the SEC and CFTC to use their existing authority to clarify which digital assets are securities, thereby subjecting them to SEC regulation, and which are non-securities falling within the CFTC’s ambit.⁵⁰ Relatedly, in line with the Clarity Act, the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets supports the long-term goal of Congress granting the CFTC the sole authority to regulate non-security digital asset trades in spot markets.⁵¹

To align federal cryptocurrency regulations with the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets’ recommendations, the SEC and CFTC have collaborated on “Project Crypto,” an initiative to establish a novel cryptocurrency taxonomy.⁵² Following “more than a hundred meetings with market participants” as part of that effort, SEC Chair Paul Atkins indicated that “most crypto tokens trading today are not themselves securities . . . [though] crypto assets can be part of or subject to an investment contract [that satisfies the Howey test].”⁵³ In line with that assessment, the SEC and CFTC jointly issued interpretive guidance that, among other things, separates digital assets into categories and “analyze[s] each category under the definition of ‘security’ under the federal securities laws.”⁵⁴ The agency identified that four of its five categories of cryptocurrency assets are not securities (this includes digital commodities, digital collectibles, digital tools, and stablecoins meeting the GENIUS Act’s definition of a “payment stablecoin issued by a permitted payment stablecoin issuer”).⁵⁵ The remaining category—“tokenized securities”—is limited to instruments that already fall within an “enumerated . . . definition of ‘security’” and are “formatted as or represented by a crypto asset.”⁵⁶ Moreover, the agency determined that, while the offer or sale of a non-security digital asset can be part of or subject to an investment contract if the underlying transaction satisfies Howey, such a determination does not permanently transform the instrument into a security.⁵⁷ Rather, a non-security digital asset that is part of an investment contract will no longer be considered a security by the SEC when the underlying agreement “terminates because either the issuer has fulfilled its representations or promises or the issuer has failed to satisfy its representations or promises.”⁵⁸ As such, secondary market cryptocurrency sales (i.e., those taking place on cryptocurrency exchanges) are outside of the SEC’s ambit if “purchasers would not reasonably expect” the non-security digital asset to remain connected to “representations or promises” that attached to the prior investment contract.⁵⁹All told, this interpretive guidance appears to signal an intent for the SEC to oversee a relatively small portion of digital assets, while the primary burden of policing cryptocurrency fraud would shift to the CFTC.

To be sure, SEC Chair Atkins has emphasized that, regardless of how digital assets are classified, the SEC and other federal agencies will continue to vigorously enforce cryptocurrency fraud.⁶⁰ As such, despite eliminating its Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit, the SEC has launched a new Cyber and Emerging Technologies Unit that is tasked with protecting retail investors from a host of cyber-related risks, including those presented by digital assets.⁶¹ More fundamentally, proponents contend that the federal government’s actions reflect a refreshing pivot to the establishment of clear rules following years of regulation by enforcement.⁶²

However, under the emerging regulatory framework, it is likely that far fewer entities will be subject to the “essential layers of protection for investors” that facilitated the SEC’s ability to root out cryptocurrency fraud during the Biden administration.⁶³ Indeed, detractors warn that the erosion of key guardrails, coupled with industry actors gaining significant political influence over rulemaking, resembles the conditions that gave rise to prior financial crises, and could lay the groundwork for a future catastrophe.⁶⁴ The possibility of such risks underscores the importance of considering whether other actors can fill an enforcement gap that may materialize.

III. Exploring State Cryptocurrency Regulatory Powers

Given the federal government’s shifting approach described in the previous section, it is critical to consider the state-level regulatory landscape. This section delves into that topic, paying particular attention to securities law, given its key role in the cryptocurrency sector. Next, the section turns to NYAG as a case study in effective state-level digital asset enforcement.

A. State Regulatory Authority Over Securities Fraud

States have no universal digital asset regulatory framework,⁶⁵ but a number have turned to their securities regulators to confront cryptocurrency fraud, much like the SEC operated at the national level under the Biden administration.⁶⁶ Due to this paper’s emphasis on state AGs, it is worth noting that only five or so states house all securities regulatory authority in their AGs’ offices.⁶⁷ Regardless, “most other states . . . have independent securities regulators whom [state AGs] advise and support.”⁶⁸ Moreover, many state blue sky laws (i.e., statutes governing securities transactions) empower state AGs to criminally or civilly penalize securities violations.⁶⁹ Thus, regardless of their specific securities law enforcement powers, state AGs can play a crucial role in protecting digital asset investors.

State securities enforcement authority is limited because the “National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) preempted broad swaths of state securities-offering regulation.”⁷⁰ For example, NSMIA reserves to the federal government the ex ante regulation of securities transactions involving public companies and many private placements.⁷¹ However, NSMIA generally allows states to establish registration regimes and “preserve[s] . . . states’ authority to enforce the antifraud provisions of their securities statutes, leaving them and the federal government with largely concurrent jurisdictions over ex post enforcement.”⁷²

In this framework, state and federal enforcers tend to complement each other by gravitating toward the area where they are best equipped to act.⁷³ To be sure, federal and state enforcers do sometimes pursue parallel securities enforcement actions⁷⁴ and collaborate in other ways, including by referring complaints and sharing information.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, federal actors, namely the SEC, generally use their national scope and vast resources to target violations that harm victims nationwide or undermine financial markets’ health.⁷⁶ Meanwhile, state enforcers are “the local cops on the securities beat,” who take “all-comers.”⁷⁷ Rather than protecting markets, state entities tend to prioritize victim restitution for harms that may fly under federal regulators’ radar, like small-scale scams targeting the elderly.⁷⁸ Given this dynamic, state enforcers handle a larger volume of cases than federal entities—a trend that holds in the cryptocurrency sector, where state securities enforcers brought 192 enforcement actions in 2023 and more than 120 in 2024, each year exceeding or approaching the total number of digital asset-related enforcement actions the SEC brought under former SEC Chair Gensler’s four-year tenure (125).⁷⁹ All told, state and federal enforcers have overlapping securities fraud jurisdiction, with the former often acting as “residual enforcers” that address localized harm that the latter, which tend to prioritize market-wide issues, may otherwise not address.⁸⁰

While notable, states’ securities law enforcement powers in the cryptocurrency space are incomplete. On a practical level, enforcement against digital asset fraud can be challenging for state regulators, given significant technological barriers and the fact that their jurisdiction may be uncertain or hard to assert across territorial borders.⁸¹ From a legal perspective, depending on their state’s statutory framework, state enforcers may not be able to leverage their state’s blue sky law at all if a court determines that a given token does not qualify as a security. Moreover, as discussed, there are preemption issues and states exercise varying degrees of authority over securities. Indeed, this authority may soon be further circumscribed, because the Clarity Act, which passed the House of Representatives with bipartisan support, could broadly preempt state securities and commodities laws with respect to their ability to impose enhanced regulations on cryptocurrency entities regulated by the SEC or CFTC.⁸² The President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets has echoed its support for this goal.⁸³ To that end, Section IV details a broader range of tools that most state AGs can use. Nevertheless, this paper now zooms in on NYAG to detail how securities, commodities, and consumer protection law enforcement powers can be combined to address challenges in the virtual currency sector.

B. New York State Office of the Attorney General Cryptocurrency Enforcement Overview

NYAG offers an aggressive state-level digital asset regulatory model. Financial malfeasance has been a top office priority since at least AG Eliot Spitzer’s tenure as the “Sheriff of Wall Street,” making NYAG “perhaps the nation’s most prominent state securities enforcer.”⁸⁴ In line with that reputation, NYAG has leveraged its securities and civil fraud enforcement powers to recover at least $2.5 billion from predatory cryptocurrency firms.⁸⁵ To be sure, other New York regulators, like the New York State Department of Financial Services, also partake in virtual currency regulation.⁸⁶ Regardless, this paper focuses on NYAG because it is the sole enforcer of statutes that facilitate the agency’s outsized impact.

NYAG polices digital asset fraud using New York General Business Law § 352 et. seq. (the Martin Act) and New York Executive Law § 63(12). The former is a blue sky law empowering NYAG to penalize fraudulent or misleading acts or representations by people or entities who “induce or promote the issuance, distribution, exchange, sale, negotiation or purchase within or from this state of any securities or commodities . . . regardless of whether [such a transaction] resulted.”⁸⁷ The latter authorizes NYAG to seek monetary and injunctive relief from anyone engaged in “repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or . . . persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business.”⁸⁸ The two laws, frequently brought together in lawsuits, form the backbone of NYAG’s cryptocurrency antifraud efforts.

Multiple core aspects make the Martin Act a powerful enforcement tool. First, to prevail on a civil claim, NYAG only needs to show that a fraud entailed a material misrepresentation or omission, without having to prove scienter, reliance, or damages.⁸⁹ Second, the law grants NYAG the power to subpoena testimony and documents from witnesses and secure preliminary injunctions against investigatory targets.⁹⁰ Third, the Martin Act applies to both securities and commodities and defines both terms broadly: securities include “any stocks, bonds, notes, evidences of interest or indebtedness or other securities,” and commodities include “any foreign currency, and any other good, article, or material.”⁹¹ When considering whether a product falls into the securities bucket, New York courts first consider whether the asset is covered by the categorical definition of “securities” in the Martin Act, and if not, they assess whether if it “meets the [statute’s] broader general definition of [other] ‘securities’” by applying tests that have “been adopted in New York” for “determining whether a given interest is a security.”⁹² The primary test is Howey, which is a boon to NYAG because, as discussed in Section II, it is adaptable to “countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.”⁹³ Some New York courts have also applied an even broader test from In Matter of Waldstein, which defines securities as “any form of instrument used for the purpose of financing and promoting enterprises, and which is designed for investment.”⁹⁴ Fourth, Martin Act § 359-e requires entities or individuals offering securities or commodities to register with the state and empowers NYAG to punish noncompliance.⁹⁵ Finally, the law allows for significant remedies, including restitution and disgorgement.⁹⁶

Executive Law § 63(12) complements the Martin Act as it is a consumer protection law that applies to repeated fraudulent and deceptive conduct beyond the securities and commodities context. Even still, violations can be premised on the same conduct as Martin Act claims, in which case the claims “stand and fall together.”⁹⁷ Moreover, also like the Martin Act, the law features broad investigatory powers, multiple relatively low legal hurdles (e.g., NYAG need not prove intent to defraud or resulting financial losses), and substantial remedies, including disgorgement.⁹⁸

In sum, with respect to cryptocurrency fraud, NYAG wields a powerful blue sky law, the Martin Act, and a strong consumer protection statute, Executive Law § 63(12). As the following sub-section demonstrates, NYAG has decisively utilized those laws’ investigatory and remedial provisions while capitalizing on their broad, complementary statutory language.

C. New York State Office of the Attorney General Digital Asset-Related Case Examples

In recent cases, New York AG Letitia James has used the Martin Act and Executive Law § 63(12) to affirm NYAG’s statutory authority over cryptocurrency and obtain relief for victims.

For instance, in James v. iFinex Inc., NYAG established that its investigatory powers apply to virtual currency companies and demonstrated that investigations can be a key precursor to settlements.⁹⁹ In 2018, NYAG started looking into two distinct but jointly operated entities—iFinex (which runs an exchange) and Tether (which issues a token, also called tether, that is an alleged stablecoin)—due to NYAG’s concern that the companies had insufficient funds to let customers redeem tether at its claimed value of one U.S. dollar per tether.¹⁰⁰ Although the respondents apparently tried to evade subpoenas issued under Martin Act § 352 and Executive Law § 63(12), NYAG ultimately learned, among other things, that iFinex had lost nearly $1 billion to a third-party vendor, which Tether helped cover by transferring $625 million to iFinex.¹⁰¹ Thereafter, NYAG secured a court order under the Martin Act compelling document production while enjoining the respondents from destroying documents or making claims about or issuing payments from Tether’s reserves.¹⁰² In upholding that order, the First Department held, inter alia, that tether is a commodity under the Martin Act’s broad definition, at least in the procedural context of affirming NYAG’s investigatory authority.¹⁰³ In so doing, the court validated NYAG’s broad regulatory authority over digital assets and laid the groundwork for an $18.5 million settlement banning Tether and iFinex from engaging in trading activities in New York.¹⁰⁴

In an ongoing matter against Alex Mashinsky, former CEO and co-founder of digital asset platform Celsius, NYAG has built on the precedent established in iFinex and further shown how Executive Law § 63(12) and the Martin Act’s broad statutory language can pull virtual currencies into its ambit. Specifically, NYAG alleges that Celsius offered a token (CEL) and accounts into which users could deposit funds that the firm would pool and invest, promising to share up to 80% of profits with users.¹⁰⁵ However, despite trumpeting a foolproof “sleep to earn” model and claiming that investments with Celsius were “as safe as [those] deposited with banks,” Mashinsky allegedly concealed risky activities and falsely stated that Celsius was “stronger than ever” when it was already insolvent, just two months before declaring bankruptcy with $4.7 billion in liabilities in July 2022.¹⁰⁶

Noting that 26,000 New Yorkers were defrauded, NYAG brought Martin Act and Executive Law § 63(12) claims against Mashinsky that proved durable enough to survive a motion to dismiss.¹⁰⁷ Critically, the court cited iFinex to find that NYAG adequately pled that CEL was a commodity under the Martin Act.¹⁰⁸ Further, the court determined that, based on NYAG’s factual allegations, Celsius accounts were securities that satisfy the Howey test because, inter alia, investing pooled deposits constituted a common enterprise and promising to share 80% of profits with users helped create an expectation of profits.¹⁰⁹ This and other alleged misrepresentations, like Mashinsky’s statements about the firm’s practices and financial stability, “support[ed] a conclusion that a reasonable investor would have viewed them as material to an investment decision,” which was sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage.¹¹⁰ Separately, the court explained that NYAG need not show injury or reliance, as “Martin Act liability does not hinge on proof of damages,” even when monetary relief may be available.¹¹¹ Finally, the court held that, by pleading a facially sufficient Martin Act securities fraud claim, NYAG also established failure to register claims under Martin Act § 359-e and multiple Executive Law § 63(12) claims.¹¹² All told, this decision further demonstrates NYAG’s regulatory authority over digital assets.

Across its cryptocurrency enforcement efforts, NYAG has leveraged Executive Law § 63(12) and the Martin Act’s favorable remedial provisions to prioritize victim restitution. For example, in 2023, NYAG sued digital asset firms Genesis, Gemini, and others for allegedly perpetrating a far-reaching fraud.¹¹³ Gemini had launched a digital asset investment program with Genesis called Gemini Earn, promising it was “a low-risk investment.”¹¹⁴ However, NYAG uncovered that, despite internal analyses showing Genesis’ exposure to risky loans, Gemini failed to monitor Genesis or warn investors, a lack of transparency and oversight that boiled over when Genesis “tried to conceal more than $1.1 billion in losses from investors, Gemini, and the public.”¹¹⁵ NYAG alleged that over 29,000 New Yorkers were defrauded, including multiple who had invested their life savings in Gemini Earn.¹¹⁶ Ultimately, in 2024, NYAG helped make those victims whole by securing a $2 billion settlement with Genesis¹¹⁷ and a $50 million settlement with Gemini.¹¹⁸ Among other conditions, the former established a victims’ fund to compensate harmed parties,¹¹⁹ while the latter automatically refunded investors who were locked out of their accounts.¹²⁰ In so doing, NYAG helped remediate widespread harm while also serving as a residual enforcer by compensating many victims whose losses may not have had market-wide ramifications, but were personally devastating.

While definitive conclusions are elusive due to a lack of published New York cryptocurrency enforcement cases, these matters reveal that Executive Law § 63(12) and the Martin Act furnish NYAG with strong digital asset regulatory authority. Those statutory tools, coupled with favorable precedent, may lead to future victories and provide NYAG with significant leverage in negotiating future settlements.¹²¹ Moreover, as shown in iFinex, even if future cases cast doubt on whether certain virtual currencies are securities, NYAG can compellingly argue that it nevertheless has jurisdiction over a given token and its issuer due to the Martin Act’s broad commodities definition. While the office will have to grapple with technological and jurisdictional issues that constrain all state securities enforcers in the digital asset context (as noted above), NYAG has established a solid foundation for holding predatory cryptocurrency actors accountable.

IV. Additional Ways That State AGs Can Seek to Fill the Federal Enforcement Gap

Some state AGs have tools comparable to those detailed in the preceding section, including their own blue sky laws. However, given vast differences in state AGs’ powers, NYAG cannot serve as a universal model. Though providing an exhaustive list of mechanisms is beyond this paper’s scope, this section highlights general ways beyond the securities and commodities law context that state AGs can use to address the potentially emerging enforcement gap discussed in Sections I and II.

A. Consumer Protection Law Enforcement Authority and Multistate Coalitions

State AGs can initiate civil actions against predatory cryptocurrency entities under their states’ unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) statutes.¹²² These laws typically proscribe certain business activities and empower state AGs and other state regulators to obtain restitution for consumers and impose various civil penalties on violators.¹²³ In the digital asset context, where decentralization and anonymity hamper enforcement, UDAP laws are emerging as powerful weapons for state AGs since claims often do not require them “to prove actual harm to consumers, or reliance . . . knowledge or intent . . . [which] has led to significant penalties . . . [as] AGs often use the threat of exposure to exact multimillion-dollar settlements.”¹²⁴ Indeed, a core part of New York’s UDAP framework is Executive Law § 63(12), which, as discussed in Section III, does not require NYAG to prove scienter, reliance, or actual harm, thereby providing the office with significant leverage in settlement negotiations.¹²⁵ Further, in 2022, California’s Department of Financial Protection and Innovation brought the first state UDAP action against a cryptocurrency firm with no “reference to securities or money transmissions.”¹²⁶ Thus, UDAP laws allow state AGs and other state enforcers to eschew thorny questions, like whether a particular token is a security or commodity, and home in on predatory digital asset companies’ unlawful acts.

State AGs can also form multistate coalitions to tackle nationwide scams. This tactic has led to “some of the largest settlements in American history” and “sweeping corporate reforms.”¹²⁷ Essentially, by combining resources and concentrating on pervasive harms, multistate coalitions can obtain extensive remedies based on the size of their combined state residents and collectively hold even the country’s most powerful entities accountable.¹²⁸

Despite potential drawbacks, multistate collations are well-suited to the digital asset space. Indeed, state AGs have secured at least one multimillion-dollar multistate settlement from a pair of cryptocurrency firms for failing to register and “lying to investors about their registration status.”¹²⁹ However, multistate actions do carry risks. For instance, they enable smaller state AGs to “piggyback” while barely contributing to coalitions, thereby potentially encouraging overenforcement since it is so easy for minimally involved offices to join, and incentivizing state AGs to focus limited resources on targeting powerful defendants causing nationwide harm, rather than addressing local issues, which are less likely to yield major settlements or headlines.¹³⁰

Still, multistate actions are worthwhile because cryptocurrency’s decentralized nature permits frauds to readily cross state lines, frustrating detection efforts, especially for financially constrained state AGs. Resource and information sharing can help address this issue. Moreover, multistate coalitions could help state AGs counter the significant political influence the cryptocurrency industry has accrued over the Trump administration, which may impair federal enforcement if regulators choose to cater to these politically favored entities.¹³¹ For example, after initiating a parallel enforcement action against Gemini and Genesis in 2023, the SEC reached a $21 million settlement with Genesis in 2024 before ultimately dropping its lawsuit against Gemini in 2026.¹³² Notably, that exchange is run by the Winklevoss twins, “who are among the president’s closest allies in the crypto industry, [and] donated to a fund-raising committee that backed Mr. Trump’s re-election campaign.”¹³³ When confronting such actors, generating additional force by coming together in multistate coalitions may well be worth the substantial resource investment required by better-funded state AGs, even if some state AGs merely piggyback on their efforts.

B. Leveraging Political Influence

State AGs are not limited to strictly legal tools. Nearly all are publicly elected, making them both legal and political actors. Accordingly, political influence can be wielded as a weapon.

One option that blends legal and political powers is suing to challenge federal regulatory regimes. These kinds of lawsuits can reflect elected state AGs’ ideological preferences, while providing them a tool to influence federal policymaking.¹³⁴ Such actions have proliferated since Massachusetts v. EPA made it easier for states to establish standing to sue the federal government.¹³⁵ So, for instance, if federal agencies refuse to enforce laws they have traditionally used to tackle digital asset fraud, state AGs can try to compel more forceful action. In so doing, they could seek to establish standing by arguing that non-enforcement financially harms their states’ residents or that parens patriae enables them to protect their citizens by “invok[ing] the protections of federal law.”¹³⁶ However, state AGs would likely struggle to establish standing or prevail on this theory, as courts hesitate to question federal agencies’ discretionary enforcement decisions.¹³⁷ Also, such lawsuits could be viewed as efforts to advance state AGs’ political ambitions. Thus, while the merits of such lawsuits should be considered on a case-by-case basis, they may often be a weapon best left unsheathed.

Separately, the bully pulpit, which entails using political persuasion instead of legal action to influence behavior, offers a route for shaping private actors’ conduct. This tactic can be highly effective. For example, former California AG Kamala Harris leveraged the bully pulpit to help secure tech companies’ compliance with state consumer privacy rules.¹³⁸ Similarly, former Illinois AG Lisa Madigan pressured job websites to stop age discrimination by opening an investigation with the goal of “fix[ing] the problem . . . not to file a lawsuit.”¹³⁹ Indeed, NYAG already uses this method in the digital asset space, including by issuing consumer alerts that warn investors about the cryptocurrency sector’s inherent risks.¹⁴⁰ To be sure, soft power is unlikely to sway fraudulent actors who run scams as a matter of course. Nevertheless, the bully pulpit is a low-cost way of pushing digital asset companies to comply with state laws while building public trust by highlighting that state AGs are seeking to safeguard their constituents.

Similarly, even large state AGs lack the federal government’s resources, so political influence can be turned to advocating for responsive state legislation. Most basically, state AGs can call for more funding for digital asset-related fraud prevention work. Further, they can seek sector-specific regulations. For instance, in 2023, NYAG proposed the Crypto Regulation, Protection, Transparency, and Oversight (CRPTO) Act, which, among other things, would enhance reporting and auditing requirements for cryptocurrency companies, prevent common ownership of digital asset firms’ interrelated functions, and mandate compensation for fraud victims.¹⁴¹ While state legislation alone cannot likely plug a possible federal enforcement gap, bills like the CRPTO Act may at least give state AGs new weapons for their arsenal.

V. Conclusion

Although the federal government appears to be reining in cryptocurrency enforcement, state AGs are not powerless to act. Rather, NYAG shows how a state’s existing securities, commodities, and consumer protection law enforcement powers can be directed at predatory digital asset firms. Further, even state AGs whose enforcement mechanisms do not resemble NYAG’s have multiple legal and political tools available, including blue sky laws, UDAPs, multistate coalitions, lawsuits challenging federal regulatory regimes, the bully pulpit, and state legislative advocacy.

However, the federal government’s regulatory reset is rapidly unfolding. Thus, additional research is needed to identify state-specific solutions. Moreover, serious attention should be given to the ramifications that the Clarity Act could have on states’ ability to fight cryptocurrency fraud, as the bill could broadly preempt state securities and commodities laws in this space if enacted.¹⁴² Finally, given that most state AGs are inherently political and that fraud prevention is uncontroversial, it may be fruitful to explore the feasibility of building bipartisan coalitions to advocate for federal regulations that empower states to police misconduct in the cryptocurrency industry. Regardless, if they so choose, state AGs acting alone or in multistate coalitions can act as key digital asset enforcers.

Abraham Nelson, J.D. Class of 2026, N.Y.U. School of Law.

Suggested Citation: Abraham Nelson, State Attorneys General Cryptocurrency Enforcement in the Second Trump Term, N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y: Quorum (2026).

Notes

1
See Matthew Bultman, States Lead Crypto Enforcement as Feds Deal with Inchoate Role, Bloomberg L. (Nov. 28, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/states-lead-crypto-enforcement-as-feds-deal-with-inchoate-role [https://perma.cc/537D-RHJQ] (discussing efforts by state regulators, including state AGs).
2
See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 Yale L.J. 2446, 2452 (2006).
3
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Report 35 (2024), https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9UU-ST6S] (reporting losses from complaints related to cryptocurrency).
4
Id.
5
See Cora Lewis, Alexandra Olson, & Associated Press, The Crypto Meltdown Has Hurt Black and Latino Investors Attracted to Building Wealth Outside of Traditional Systems: ‘It was great until it wasn’t’, Fortune (Mar. 27, 2023), https://fortune.com/2023/03/27/crypto-meltdown-black-latino-investors/ [https://perma.cc/9689-WWKU]; Scott Medintz, Black and Latino Consumers Are More Likely to Lose Money to Digital Scams, a Consumer Reports Study Finds, Consumer Reps. (Oct. 1, 2024), https://www.consumerreports.org/money/scams-fraud/black-latino-consumers-more-likely-to-lose-money-in-scams-a7652153980/ [https://perma.cc/F6LU-F8J9]
6
See Kevin Roose, The Latecomer’s Guide to Crypto, N.Y. Times (Mar. 18, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/03/18/technology/cryptocurrency-crypto-guide.html [https://perma.cc/TDB3-Q28A].
7
See Crypto Assets, Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., https://www.finra.org/investors/investing/investment-products/crypto-assets [https://perma.cc/G5UE-ZVZZ] (last visited Mar. 6, 2026).
8
See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 2023 Cryptocurrency Fraud Report 11 (2024), https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2023_IC3CryptocurrencyReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJC3-2V5H].
9
See David Yaffe-Bellany, Inside a Crypto Nemesis’ Campaign to Rein in the Industry, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/21/technology/gary-gensler-crypto-sec.html [https://perma.cc/75BV-B82T].
10
See id.
11
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Cryptocurrencies (HBO television broadcast, aired Mar. 11, 2018).
12
See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Pub. No. 153 (7/13), Investor Alert: Ponzi Schemes Using Virtual Currencies (2013), https://www.sec.gov/files/ia_virtualcurrencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT8R-AEQF].
13
Att’y Gen. All., Digital Assets White Paper 13 (2022), https://files.constantcontact.com/48922045201/588b8eba-571d-4075-a708-69c6dda04cc5.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V4E-GFK3].
14
Paul Tierno, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47425, Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues 20 (2023).
15
See Gurbir S. Grewal, What’s Past Is Prologue: Enforcing the Federal Securities Laws in the Age of Crypto, 15 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 475, 482–85 (2024) (discussing notable cryptocurrency fraud enforcement actions).
16
Exec. Order No. 14178, 90 Fed. Reg. 8647, 8648 (Jan. 23, 2025).
17
President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology 5-8, 144, 152 (2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Digital-Assets-Report-EO14178.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YCT-3PTH].
18
See Ben Protess et al.,The S.E.C. Was Tough on Crypto. It Pulled Back After Trump Returned to Office, N.Y. Times (Dec. 14, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/14/us/politics/sec-crypto-firms-trump-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/WB7Q-RDTT].
19
Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., Crypto’s $4 Trillion Moment, N.Y. Times (July 18, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/18/business/dealbook/crypto-genius-act-congress.html [https://perma.cc/YVZ3-GAF6]; Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act, Pub. L. No. 119-27, 139 Stat. 419 (2025); Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025, H.R. 3633, 119th Cong. (2025). The GENIUS Act only regulates stablecoins, so it is largely outside of this paper’s scope, but for additional information and outstanding considerations related to the GENIUS Act’s implementation, seeNellie Liang, Stablecoins: Issues for Regulators as They Implement GENIUS Act, Brookings (Oct. 21, 2025), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/stablecoins-issues-for-regulators-as-they-implement-genius-act/ [https://perma.cc/X7J8-ELJ6].
20
Are Cryptocurrencies Securities?, The Economist (June 12, 2023), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/06/12/are-cryptocurrencies-securities [https://perma.cc/ZK5V-MX47].
21
See id.; Tierno, supra note 14, at 20–24.
22
See Att’y Gen. All., supra note 13, at 14–17; Christopher Beam, The Worst of Crypto Is Yet to Come, The Atlantic (Oct. 30, 2024), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/10/crypto-lobbying-trump-harris/680445/ [https://perma.cc/GMV2-A5S8].
23
Gary Gensler, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Speaks: Kennedy and Crypto (Sept. 8, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/gensler-sec-speaks-090822 [https://perma.cc/P5KK-8YB2].
24
See id.; SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
25
Grewal, supra note 15, at 480.
26
See id. at 485 (collecting cases).
27
Compare Maria Gracia Santillana Linares, How the SEC’s Charge that Cryptos Are Securities Could Face an Uphill Battle, Forbes (Aug. 14, 2023), https://www.forbes.com/sites/digital-assets/2023/08/14/how-the-secs-charge-that-cryptos-are-securities-could-face-an-uphill-battle/ [https://perma.cc/4TFB-8RJJ] (explaining that, in SEC v. Ripple Labs, Judge Torres in the Southern District of New York found that investors lack a reasonable expectation of profits when buying tokens in secondary markets) with Nikhilesh De, Judge Rejects Ripple Ruling Precedent in Denying Terraform Labs’ Motion to Dismiss SEC Lawsuit, Yahoo! Fin. (July 31, 2023), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/judge-rejects-ripple-ruling-precedent-211353623.html [https://perma.cc/6FC5-TUQM] (discussing that Judge Rakoff in the Southern District of New York refused to apply Ripple because “Howey makes no such distinction between purchasers. And it makes good sense that it did not. That a purchaser bought the coins directly from the defendants or, instead, in a secondary resale transaction has no impact on whether a reasonable individual would objectively view the defendants’ actions and statements as evincing a promise of profits based on their efforts”).
28
See Gensler, supra note 23.
29
See Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 9.
30
See Gensler, supra note 23; Grewal, supra note 15, at 479, 486–88 (internal citations omitted).
31
See Grewal, supra note 15, at 487; Beam, supra note 22.
32
See Grewal, supra note 15, at 487.
33
See Gensler, supra note 23; Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 9; see also Grewal, supra note 15, at 493–95 (detailing enforcement actions).
34
Akshay S. Ralhi, Beyond Enforcement: The SEC’s Shifting Playbook on Crypto Regulation, Georgetown L. CBTL Blog (May 9, 2025), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/ctbl/blog/beyond-enforcement-the-secs-shifting-playbook-on-crypto-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/WC8Q-C2VX] (reporting actions initiated from April 2021 to December 2024 and penalties imposed); Abe Chernin, Nicole M. Moran, & Robert Letson, Cornerstone Rsch., SEC Cryptocurrency Enforcement: 2025 Update (2026), https://www.cornerstone.com/insights/research/sec-cryptocurrency-enforcement-2025-update/ [https://perma.cc/4M9R-BCHB] (reporting number of actions involving fraud and total actions initiated in 2021 through 2024).
35
See Gensler, supra note 24 (noting in September 2022 that only a “handful of crypto security tokens ha[d] registered.”).
36
Tierno, supra note 14, at 23 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
37
See id. at 23 (citing CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 498 (D. Mass. 2018).
38
See Beam, supra note 22.
39
See Tierno, supra note 14, at 21–24; Robert Stevens, Securities vs. Commodities: Why It Matters for Crypto, CoinDesk (Mar. 12, 2024), https://www.coindesk.com/learn/securities-vs-commodities-why-it-matters-for-crypto [https://perma.cc/7G7P-PKP6].
40
See Tierno, supra note 14, at 24.
41
See Christian T. Kemnitz et al., Will History Repeat Itself? Peering Into the Past to Predict the Next Four Years of CFTC Enforcement Actions, Nat’l L. Rev. (Jan. 28, 2025), https://natlawreview.com/article/will-history-repeat-itself-peering-past-predict-next-four-years-cftc-enforcement [https://perma.cc/N29M-AU88] (reporting 85 digital-asset-related enforcement actions from 2021–2023); Addendum to Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Release No. 9011-24, CFTC Releases FY 2024 Enforcement Results (Dec. 4, 2024), https://www.cftc.gov/media/11596/DOE_ResultsFY24_AddendumA120424/download [https://perma.cc/DUK9-LRGR] (compiling 10 digital asset-related enforcement actions filed in fiscal year 2024); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Release No. 9011-24, CFTC Releases FY 2024 Enforcement Results (Dec. 4, 2024), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/9011-24 [https://perma.cc/NS5W-8DEZ] (reporting 2024 settlements with Binance and FTX).
42
Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra note 41. Cumulative data is unavailable, so $15.5 billion reflects the amount secured from the CFTC’s settlements with Binance and FTX, by far the agency’s largest digital asset-related settlements in fiscal year 2024.
43
Across all cases (not just digital asset cases), the CFTC collected $17.1 billion in monetary penalties in 2024, with about $15.5 billion of that total coming from the FTX and Binance settlements. Id.
44
Eleanor Terrett, Trump Admin Eyes CFTC to Lead Digital Asset Regulation, Fox Bus. (Nov. 24, 2024), https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/trump-admin-eyes-cftc-lead-digital-asset-regulation [https://perma.cc/XJ8C-7SFC].
45
Beam, supra note 22; Jacob Bogage, House Votes to Make CFTC Main Crypto Regulator, a Win for the Industry, Wash. Post (May 22, 2024), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/05/22/crypto-cftc-sec-house-vote/ [https://perma.cc/EUF9-KQF2] (“Crypto leaders have long preferred having the CFTC instead of the SEC as the industry’s top regulator.”).
46
See Matthew Goldstein, Eric Lipton, and David Yaffe-Bellany, S.E.C. Moves to Scale Back Its Crypto Enforcement Efforts, N.Y. Times (Feb. 4, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/04/business/sec-crypto-task-force.html [https://perma.cc/J9GM-HGGV].
47
See Jennifer Schonberger, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce Promises ‘More Clarity’ for Crypto Industry, Yahoo! Fin. (Feb. 21, 2025), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/sec-commissioner-hester-peirce-promises-more-clarity-for-crypto-industry-234129393.html [https://perma.cc/SP62-SFSL].
48
See Hannah Lang & Chris Prentice, US Securities Regulator Files to Dismiss Lawsuit Against Coinbase, Reuters (Feb. 27, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-securities-regulator-drop-lawsuit-against-coinbase-exchange-says-2025-02-21/ [https://perma.cc/7S9X-TB3L]; Matthew Goldstein, S.E.C. Drops Lawsuit Against Binance, a Crypto Exchange, N.Y. Times (May 29, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/29/business/sec-binance-lawsuit-dropped.html [https://perma.cc/4KRS-7CX4]; Mrinmay Dey, SEC Agrees to Dismiss Case Over Crypto Lending by Winklevoss’ Gemini, Reuters (Jan. 26, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/sec-agrees-dismiss-case-over-crypto-lending-by-winklevoss-gemini-2026-01-24/ [https://perma.cc/LA4Y-C76G].
49
See President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, supra note 17, at 45.
50
See Mark Chorazak et al., A Closer Look at the Trump Administration’s Comprehensive Report on Digital Assets, Skadden (Aug. 8, 2025), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2025/08/a-closer-look-at-the-trump-administrations-comprehensive-report-on-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/5EAF-7Z3Q].
51
See id.
52
See Paul S. Atkins, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks at Joint SEC-CFTC Harmonization Event – Project Crypto (Jan. 29, 2026), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/atkins-remarks-joint-sec-cftcharmonization-event-project-crypto-012926 [https://perma.cc/Q7H7-SV3W]; Michael S. Selig, Chair, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, The Next Phase of Project Crypto: Unleashing Innovation for the New Frontier of Finance (Jan. 29, 2026), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaselig1 [https://perma.cc/V47W-AYF4].
53
See Paul Atkins, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The SEC’s Approach to Digital Assets: Inside “Project Crypto” (Nov. 12, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/atkins-111225-secs-approach-digital-assets-inside-project-crypto [https://perma.cc/D4P3-3WPR].
54
Fact Sheet, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Certain Types of Crypto Assets and Certain Transactions Involving Crypto Assets (Mar. 23, 2026), https://www.sec.gov/files/33-11412-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MEM-H46R].
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See id. (“[A] non-security crypto asset becomes subject to an investment contract when an issuer offers it by inducing an investment of money in a common enterprise with representations or promises to undertake essential managerial efforts from which a purchaser would reasonably expect to derive profits.”); Kayvan Sadeghi, Charles D. Riely, & Navjit Sekhon, SEC and CFTC Issue Landmark Joint Interpretation on Crypto Asset Classification, Jenner & Block (Mar. 20, 2026), https://www.jenner.com/en/news-insights/client-alerts/sec-and-cftc-issue-landmark-joint-interpretation-on-crypto-asset-classification [https://perma.cc/PPR4-GUBP].
58
See Fact Sheet, supra note 54.
59
See Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Certain Types of Crypto Assets and Certain Transactions Involving Crypto Assets, 91 Fed. Reg. 13714 (Mar. 23, 2026), 13722; see also Sadeghi, Riely, & Sekhon, supra note 57.
60
See Atkins, supra note 53.
61
See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. 2025-42, SEC Announces Cyber and Emerging Technologies Unit to Protect Retail Investors (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025-42 [https://perma.cc/Q39B-DWE7].
62
See Emily Ekshian, Inside Washington’s Strategic Overhaul of Crypto Policy in 2025, Crypto Council for Innovation (June 14, 2025), https://cryptoforinnovation.org/inside-washingtons-strategic-overhaul-of-crypto-policy-in-2025/ [https://perma.cc/FD4H-AC4T].
63
See Grewal, supra note 15, at 487.
64
See Tonantzin Carmona, Protecting the American Public from Crypto Cisks and Harms, Brookings (June 2, 2025), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protecting-the-american-public-from-crypto-risks-and-harms/ [https://perma.cc/8FQL-K9SW].
65
See generally Joseph Jasperse, Stevens Ctr. for Innovation Fin.,50-State Review of Cryptocurrency and Blockchain (Feb. 2023), https://stevenscenter.wharton.upenn.edu/publications-50-state-review [https://perma.cc/9ESD-7FT5] (detailing different regulations in each state).
66
See Andrew K. Jennings, State Securities Enforcement, 47 BYU L. Rev. 67, 99 (2021).
67
Id. at 85; Att’y Gen. All., supra note 13, at 8 (noting that Delaware, New York, South Carolina, Maryland, and New Jersey give the AG or a securities regulator within the AG’s office “original jurisdiction for enforcing state securities laws.”).
68
Att’y Gen. All., supra note 13, at 8.
69
See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 517.191(11) (West 2024); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-51-603.5(1) (West 2025).
70
Jennings, supra note 66, at 69.
71
Id. at 75.
72
See id. at 69, 79–82 (discussing state enforcement, including state registration violations).
73
See id. at 73–74.
74
See, e.g., Christopher Oster & Tom Lauricella, Janus Agrees to a Settlement of $226 Million, Wall St. J. (Apr. 28, 2004), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108309380536794940 (detailing a settlement between an investment firm, the SEC, and state regulators).
75
See Jennings, supra note 66, at 103, 119–21 (discussing tip referrals and information sharing, but noting that such coordination is often limited and fragmented).
76
See id. at 75, 90.
77
Id. at 82, 89 (quoting The Role of State Securities Regulators in Protecting Investors: Hearing on Efforts to Enforce Securities Laws, Investment Advisor Registration and Licensing, State Investigations into Mutual Fund Industry Abuses, and Investor Education Programs Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affs., 108th Cong. 34 (2004) (statement of Ralph A. Lambiase, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n)).
78
See id. at 74, 91–94.
79
N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, 2024 Enforcement Report 6 (2024), https://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FINAL_2024-Enforcement-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY9S-L8V6] (reporting “37 enforcement actions involving digital asset staking and 155 enforcement actions involving other digital assets” in 2023); N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, 2025 Enforcement Report 19 (2025), https://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/2025-NASAA-Enforcement-Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/S25K-AUDD] (indicating that states brought “more than 120 [digital asset-related] enforcement actions” in 2024); Ralhi, supra note 34.
80
See Jennings, supra note 66, at 130–31.
81
See N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, 2025 Enforcement Report, supra note 79, at 8.
82
See Ro Spaziani et al., Update on the U.S. Digital Assets Regulatory Framework – Market Structure, Banking, Payments, and Taxation, Gibson Dunn (Aug. 5, 2025), https://www.gibsondunn.com/update-on-the-us-digital-assets-regulatory-framework-market-structure-banking-payments-and-taxation/ [https://perma.cc/8MHN-KQDC] (noting preemptive effects related to “registration or qualification requirements on offers or sales of” digital commodities and activities of “registered digital commodity exchanges, digital commodity brokers, and digital commodity dealers . . . subject to the Commodity Exchange Act”); Letter from Leslie M. Van Buskirk, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, to Sen. Tim Scott, Chair, & Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs. 5 (Aug. 5, 2025), https://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/NASAA-Urges-Congress-to-Protect-Investment-Contract-Law-and-Pass-the-Support-Anti-Fraud-Enforcement-Act-8.5.25-F.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H7W-SMLA] (expressing concern that new legislation could be read to “prohibit[], limit[], or otherwise restrict[] [non-federal securities administrators’] ability to bring administrative, civil, or criminal anti-fraud enforcement actions under or consistent with present state or federal securities or commodities laws” and urging the adoption of language in the Clarity Act or elsewhere that would make it “abundantly clear” that the legislation does not have such preemptive effect).
83
See President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, supra note 17, at 55.
84
See Jennings, supra note 66, at 84–85.
85
Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Secures Settlement Worth $2 Billion from Crypto Firm Genesis Global Capital for Defrauded Victims (May 20, 2024), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2024/attorney-general-james-secures-settlement-worth-2-billion-crypto-firm-genesis [https://perma.cc/A8CD-2MXG] [hereinafter Genesis Settlement Press Release].
86
Most notably, the New York State Department of Financial Services requires digital asset firms to obtain a BitLicense or a state banking charter before engaging in virtual currency-related commercial activities with New Yorkers. See generally Virtual Currency Businesses, N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs. , https://www.dfs.ny.gov/virtual_currency_businesses [https://perma.cc/46KF-UPK7] (last visited Mar. 8, 2026).
87
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352-c(1), 353 (McKinney 2025).
88
N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(12) (McKinney 2025).
89
See State v. Rachmani Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 718, 725 n.6 (N.Y. 1988); People ex rel. Schneiderman v. Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC, 107 N.E.3d 515, 520 (N.Y. 2018) (citations omitted); People ex rel. Cuomo v. Greenberg, No. 401720/05, 2010 WL 4732745, at *35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010), aff’d as modified, 946 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (“Proof of actual damages, injury or reliance are not a required element for liability to accrue under the Martin Act.”).
90
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352(2)–(4), 354 (McKinney 2025); see also James v. iFinex Inc., 127 N.Y.S.3d 456, 463–64 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) (discussing NYAG’s power pursuant to Martin Act § 352 and § 354).
91
See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352(1), 359-e(14)(a)(i) (McKinney 2025); see also iFinex, 127 N.Y.S.3d at 461 (explaining that the Martin Act’s definition of commodities is expansive enough to include cryptocurrencies).
92
See All Seasons Resorts, Inc. v. Abrams, 497 N.E.2d 33, 36, 39 (N.Y. 1986)).
93
See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
94
See In Matter of Waldstein, 160 Misc. 763, 767 (Sup. Ct. Albany County Oct. 22, 1936); People v. Van Zandt, 43 Misc. 3d 563, 573, 981 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014); Xerox Corp. v. New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal, 973 N.Y.S.2d 458, 643 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); see also People ex rel. James v. Mashinsky, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 50826(U), *7 n.7 (Sup. Ct. 2023) (internal citations omitted) (“It is ultimately unclear whether the Waldstein approach is still accepted in this state after the First Meridian decision . . . Assuming, without deciding, that the Waldstein test is an accepted approach, the EIAs satisfy this test because the EIAs allowed Celsius to finance the collateralized loans it offered as part of its profit-generating efforts”).
95
See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 359-e (McKinney 2025); People ex rel. James v. Mashinsky, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 50826(U), *15 (Sup. Ct. 2023) (explaining details).
96
See People ex rel. Schneiderman v. Greenberg, 54 N.E.3d 74, 77 (N.Y. 2016); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 353(3) (McKinney 2025).
97
See, e.g., Mashinsky, slip op. at *16 (citing People ex rel. Cuomo v. Greenberg, 946 N.Y.S.2d 1, 8–9 (App. Div. 2012), aff’d, 994 N.E.2d 838 (N.Y. 2013)) (other citations omitted).
98
See N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(12) (McKinney 2025); see also Ben Protess, William K. Rashbaum, & Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Trump Is Battling a New York Law Used to Take on Corporate Giants, N.Y. Times (Sept. 23, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/23/nyregion/donald-trump-letitia-james-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/6JQ8-FLWH].
99
See James v. iFinex Inc., 127 N.Y.S.3d 456, 459–61 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).
100
Id. at 459.
101
Id. at 460.
102
See id.
103
See id. at 460–61.
104
See Michael del Castillo, New York Court Approves Investigation Into $10 Billion Cryptocurrency Created by a Presidential Candidate, Forbes (July 9, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2020/07/09/ny-supreme-court-approves-investigation-into-10-billion-cryptocurrency-created-by-a-presidential-candidate/ [https://perma.cc/5CX7-J9ME] (reporting statement by AG James); Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Ends Virtual Currency Trading Platform Bitfinex’s Illegal Activities in New York (Feb. 23, 2021), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021/attorney-general-james-ends-virtual-currency-trading-platform-bitfinexs-illegal [https://perma.cc/ET5H-G4Y6].
105
People ex rel. James v. Mashinsky, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 50826(U), *1-2 (Sup. Ct. 2023).
106
See id. at *1–4.
107
See id. at *4–5, *18; Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Sues Former CEO of Celsius Cryptocurrency Platform for Defrauding Investors (Jan. 5, 2023), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2023/attorney-general-james-sues-former-ceo-celsius-cryptocurrency-platform-defrauding [https://perma.cc/KN7J-67DA].
108
Mashinsky, slip op. at *9 (citing James v iFinex Inc., 127 N.Y.S.3d 456, 461 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)).
109
See id. at *6–9.
110
See id. at *12–14.
111
See id. at *14.
112
See id. at *14–16.
113
Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Sues Cryptocurrency Companies Gemini, Genesis, and DCG for Defrauding Investors (Oct. 19, 2023), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2023/attorney-general-james-sues-cryptocurrency-companies-gemini-genesis-and-dcg [https://perma.cc/T63X-R2RW].
114
See id.
115
See id.
116
See id.
117
Genesis Settlement Press Release, supra note 85.
118
Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Recovers $50 Million from Crypto Firm Gemini for Defrauded Investors (June 14, 2024), https://on.ny.gov/4c6GsDM [https://perma.cc/7DC3-N79P] [hereinafter Gemini Settlement].
119
Genesis Settlement Press Release, supra note 85.
120
Gemini Settlement, supra note 118.
121
Cf. Protess, Rashbaum, & O’Brien, supra note 98 (explaining how the threat of disgorgement highly incentivizes settlements).
122
See Att’y Gen. All. , supra note 13, at 7.
123
See Carolyn Carter, National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Protection in the States 11 (2018), https://www.nclc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/UDAP_rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/THG6-EB42].
124
See Daniel R. Suvor et al., State UDAP Enforcement Poses New Risk for Crypto Companies, O’Melveny & Myers LLP (Jan. 27, 2023), https://www.omm.com/insights/alerts-publications/state-udap-enforcement-poses-new-risk-for-crypto-companies/ [https://perma.cc/JA88-B2VX ].
125
See Carter, supra note 123, app. C at 65–67, https://www.nclc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/udap-appC-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6L4-Y7Z9]; Protess, Rashbaum, & O’Brien, supra note 98 (covering disgorgement leverage).
126
Benjamin Cooper, Analysis: Treating Crypto Fraud as Consumer Scam Gains Traction, Bloomberg L. (Dec. 1, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-treating-crypto-fraud-as-consumer-scam-gains-traction [https://perma.cc/9QG4-RMNV].
127
Elysa M. Dishman, Class Action Squared: Multistate Actions and Agency Dilemmas, 96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 291, 304–05 (2020).
128
See id. at 303–08.
129
Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James and Multistate Coalition Secure $24 Million from Cryptocurrency Platform Nexo for Operating Illegally (Jan. 19, 2023), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2023/attorney-general-james-and-multistate-coalition-secure-24-million-cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/T558-HEQR].
130
Elysa M. Dishman, Enforcement Piggybacking and Multistate Actions, 2019 BYU L. Rev. 421, 429–30 (2020).
131
See Alan Suderman, How an Emboldened Crypto Industry is Trying to Cement Political Influence, PBS News (Feb. 17, 2025), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/how-an-emboldened-crypto-industry-is-trying-to-cement-political-influence [https://perma.cc/L3T4-GY6K]; Protess, supra note 18.
132
Ben Protess and Sharon LaFraniere, S.E.C. Drops Case Against Cryptocurrency Firm Founded by Winklevoss Twins, N.Y. Times (Jan. 23, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/23/us/politics/sec-crypto-winklevoss.html [https://perma.cc/PX7Q-GVCX].
133
Id.
134
See Mark Miller, State Attorneys General, Political Lawsuits, and Their Collective Voice in the Inter-Institutional Constitutional Dialogue, 48 Notre Dame J. Legis. 1, 19–20 (2022).
135
See id. at 24–25.
136
See Michael J. Myers & Turner Smith, “Special Solicitude” or “Special Hostility?:” Where State Standing in Environmental Litigation Stands 17 Years After Massachusetts v. EPA, 42 UCLA J. Env’t L. & Pol’y 207, 221, 235 (2024).
137
See id. at 235.
138
See George R. Lynch, Privacy Wins, No Matter Who Claims California Senate Seat, Bloomberg L. (July 28, 2016), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglawnews/bloomberg-law-news/X6SNADMG000000 [https://perma.cc/RTQ7-P7QE].
139
See Ina Jaffe, Older Workers Find Age Discrimination Built Right into Some Job Websites, NPR (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/28/521771515/older-workers-find-age-discrimination-built-right-into-some-job-sites [https://perma.cc/3PLL-F6WJ].
140
See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Warns Investors About ‘Extreme Risk’ When Investing in Cryptocurrency, Issues Additional Warning to Those Facilitating Trading of Virtual Currencies (Mar. 1, 2021), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021/attorney-general-james-warns-investors-about-extreme-risk-when-investing [https://perma.cc/UDH3-N5CS].
141
Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Proposes Nation-Leading Regulations on Cryptocurrency Industry (May 5, 2023), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2023/attorney-general-james-proposes-nation-leading-regulations-cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/U2NP-LUXT].
142
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.

1
See Matthew Bultman, States Lead Crypto Enforcement as Feds Deal with Inchoate Role, Bloomberg L. (Nov. 28, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/states-lead-crypto-enforcement-as-feds-deal-with-inchoate-role [https://perma.cc/537D-RHJQ] (discussing efforts by state regulators, including state AGs).
2
See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 Yale L.J. 2446, 2452 (2006).
3
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Report 35 (2024), https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9UU-ST6S] (reporting losses from complaints related to cryptocurrency).
4
Id.
5
See Cora Lewis, Alexandra Olson, & Associated Press, The Crypto Meltdown Has Hurt Black and Latino Investors Attracted to Building Wealth Outside of Traditional Systems: ‘It was great until it wasn’t’, Fortune (Mar. 27, 2023), https://fortune.com/2023/03/27/crypto-meltdown-black-latino-investors/ [https://perma.cc/9689-WWKU]; Scott Medintz, Black and Latino Consumers Are More Likely to Lose Money to Digital Scams, a Consumer Reports Study Finds, Consumer Reps. (Oct. 1, 2024), https://www.consumerreports.org/money/scams-fraud/black-latino-consumers-more-likely-to-lose-money-in-scams-a7652153980/ [https://perma.cc/F6LU-F8J9]
6
See Kevin Roose, The Latecomer’s Guide to Crypto, N.Y. Times (Mar. 18, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/03/18/technology/cryptocurrency-crypto-guide.html [https://perma.cc/TDB3-Q28A].
7
See Crypto Assets, Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., https://www.finra.org/investors/investing/investment-products/crypto-assets [https://perma.cc/G5UE-ZVZZ] (last visited Mar. 6, 2026).
8
See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 2023 Cryptocurrency Fraud Report 11 (2024), https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2023_IC3CryptocurrencyReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJC3-2V5H].
9
See David Yaffe-Bellany, Inside a Crypto Nemesis’ Campaign to Rein in the Industry, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/21/technology/gary-gensler-crypto-sec.html [https://perma.cc/75BV-B82T].
10
See id.
11
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Cryptocurrencies (HBO television broadcast, aired Mar. 11, 2018).
12
See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Pub. No. 153 (7/13), Investor Alert: Ponzi Schemes Using Virtual Currencies (2013), https://www.sec.gov/files/ia_virtualcurrencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT8R-AEQF].
13
Att’y Gen. All., Digital Assets White Paper 13 (2022), https://files.constantcontact.com/48922045201/588b8eba-571d-4075-a708-69c6dda04cc5.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V4E-GFK3].
14
Paul Tierno, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47425, Cryptocurrency: Selected Policy Issues 20 (2023).
15
See Gurbir S. Grewal, What’s Past Is Prologue: Enforcing the Federal Securities Laws in the Age of Crypto, 15 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 475, 482–85 (2024) (discussing notable cryptocurrency fraud enforcement actions).
16
Exec. Order No. 14178, 90 Fed. Reg. 8647, 8648 (Jan. 23, 2025).
17
President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology 5-8, 144, 152 (2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Digital-Assets-Report-EO14178.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YCT-3PTH].
18
See Ben Protess et al.,The S.E.C. Was Tough on Crypto. It Pulled Back After Trump Returned to Office, N.Y. Times (Dec. 14, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/14/us/politics/sec-crypto-firms-trump-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/WB7Q-RDTT].
19
Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., Crypto’s $4 Trillion Moment, N.Y. Times (July 18, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/18/business/dealbook/crypto-genius-act-congress.html [https://perma.cc/YVZ3-GAF6]; Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act, Pub. L. No. 119-27, 139 Stat. 419 (2025); Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025, H.R. 3633, 119th Cong. (2025). The GENIUS Act only regulates stablecoins, so it is largely outside of this paper’s scope, but for additional information and outstanding considerations related to the GENIUS Act’s implementation, seeNellie Liang, Stablecoins: Issues for Regulators as They Implement GENIUS Act, Brookings (Oct. 21, 2025), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/stablecoins-issues-for-regulators-as-they-implement-genius-act/ [https://perma.cc/X7J8-ELJ6].
20
Are Cryptocurrencies Securities?, The Economist (June 12, 2023), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/06/12/are-cryptocurrencies-securities [https://perma.cc/ZK5V-MX47].
21
See id.; Tierno, supra note 14, at 20–24.
22
See Att’y Gen. All., supra note 13, at 14–17; Christopher Beam, The Worst of Crypto Is Yet to Come, The Atlantic (Oct. 30, 2024), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/10/crypto-lobbying-trump-harris/680445/ [https://perma.cc/GMV2-A5S8].
23
Gary Gensler, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Speaks: Kennedy and Crypto (Sept. 8, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/gensler-sec-speaks-090822 [https://perma.cc/P5KK-8YB2].
24
See id.; SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
25
Grewal, supra note 15, at 480.
26
See id. at 485 (collecting cases).
27
Compare Maria Gracia Santillana Linares, How the SEC’s Charge that Cryptos Are Securities Could Face an Uphill Battle, Forbes (Aug. 14, 2023), https://www.forbes.com/sites/digital-assets/2023/08/14/how-the-secs-charge-that-cryptos-are-securities-could-face-an-uphill-battle/ [https://perma.cc/4TFB-8RJJ] (explaining that, in SEC v. Ripple Labs, Judge Torres in the Southern District of New York found that investors lack a reasonable expectation of profits when buying tokens in secondary markets) with Nikhilesh De, Judge Rejects Ripple Ruling Precedent in Denying Terraform Labs’ Motion to Dismiss SEC Lawsuit, Yahoo! Fin. (July 31, 2023), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/judge-rejects-ripple-ruling-precedent-211353623.html [https://perma.cc/6FC5-TUQM] (discussing that Judge Rakoff in the Southern District of New York refused to apply Ripple because “Howey makes no such distinction between purchasers. And it makes good sense that it did not. That a purchaser bought the coins directly from the defendants or, instead, in a secondary resale transaction has no impact on whether a reasonable individual would objectively view the defendants’ actions and statements as evincing a promise of profits based on their efforts”).
28
See Gensler, supra note 23.
29
See Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 9.
30
See Gensler, supra note 23; Grewal, supra note 15, at 479, 486–88 (internal citations omitted).
31
See Grewal, supra note 15, at 487; Beam, supra note 22.
32
See Grewal, supra note 15, at 487.
33
See Gensler, supra note 23; Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 9; see also Grewal, supra note 15, at 493–95 (detailing enforcement actions).
34
Akshay S. Ralhi, Beyond Enforcement: The SEC’s Shifting Playbook on Crypto Regulation, Georgetown L. CBTL Blog (May 9, 2025), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/ctbl/blog/beyond-enforcement-the-secs-shifting-playbook-on-crypto-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/WC8Q-C2VX] (reporting actions initiated from April 2021 to December 2024 and penalties imposed); Abe Chernin, Nicole M. Moran, & Robert Letson, Cornerstone Rsch., SEC Cryptocurrency Enforcement: 2025 Update (2026), https://www.cornerstone.com/insights/research/sec-cryptocurrency-enforcement-2025-update/ [https://perma.cc/4M9R-BCHB] (reporting number of actions involving fraud and total actions initiated in 2021 through 2024).
35
See Gensler, supra note 24 (noting in September 2022 that only a “handful of crypto security tokens ha[d] registered.”).
36
Tierno, supra note 14, at 23 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
37
See id. at 23 (citing CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 498 (D. Mass. 2018).
38
See Beam, supra note 22.
39
See Tierno, supra note 14, at 21–24; Robert Stevens, Securities vs. Commodities: Why It Matters for Crypto, CoinDesk (Mar. 12, 2024), https://www.coindesk.com/learn/securities-vs-commodities-why-it-matters-for-crypto [https://perma.cc/7G7P-PKP6].
40
See Tierno, supra note 14, at 24.
41
See Christian T. Kemnitz et al., Will History Repeat Itself? Peering Into the Past to Predict the Next Four Years of CFTC Enforcement Actions, Nat’l L. Rev. (Jan. 28, 2025), https://natlawreview.com/article/will-history-repeat-itself-peering-past-predict-next-four-years-cftc-enforcement [https://perma.cc/N29M-AU88] (reporting 85 digital-asset-related enforcement actions from 2021–2023); Addendum to Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Release No. 9011-24, CFTC Releases FY 2024 Enforcement Results (Dec. 4, 2024), https://www.cftc.gov/media/11596/DOE_ResultsFY24_AddendumA120424/download [https://perma.cc/DUK9-LRGR] (compiling 10 digital asset-related enforcement actions filed in fiscal year 2024); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Release No. 9011-24, CFTC Releases FY 2024 Enforcement Results (Dec. 4, 2024), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/9011-24 [https://perma.cc/NS5W-8DEZ] (reporting 2024 settlements with Binance and FTX).
42
Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra note 41. Cumulative data is unavailable, so $15.5 billion reflects the amount secured from the CFTC’s settlements with Binance and FTX, by far the agency’s largest digital asset-related settlements in fiscal year 2024.
43
Across all cases (not just digital asset cases), the CFTC collected $17.1 billion in monetary penalties in 2024, with about $15.5 billion of that total coming from the FTX and Binance settlements. Id.
44
Eleanor Terrett, Trump Admin Eyes CFTC to Lead Digital Asset Regulation, Fox Bus. (Nov. 24, 2024), https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/trump-admin-eyes-cftc-lead-digital-asset-regulation [https://perma.cc/XJ8C-7SFC].
45
Beam, supra note 22; Jacob Bogage, House Votes to Make CFTC Main Crypto Regulator, a Win for the Industry, Wash. Post (May 22, 2024), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/05/22/crypto-cftc-sec-house-vote/ [https://perma.cc/EUF9-KQF2] (“Crypto leaders have long preferred having the CFTC instead of the SEC as the industry’s top regulator.”).
46
See Matthew Goldstein, Eric Lipton, and David Yaffe-Bellany, S.E.C. Moves to Scale Back Its Crypto Enforcement Efforts, N.Y. Times (Feb. 4, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/04/business/sec-crypto-task-force.html [https://perma.cc/J9GM-HGGV].
47
See Jennifer Schonberger, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce Promises ‘More Clarity’ for Crypto Industry, Yahoo! Fin. (Feb. 21, 2025), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/sec-commissioner-hester-peirce-promises-more-clarity-for-crypto-industry-234129393.html [https://perma.cc/SP62-SFSL].
48
See Hannah Lang & Chris Prentice, US Securities Regulator Files to Dismiss Lawsuit Against Coinbase, Reuters (Feb. 27, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-securities-regulator-drop-lawsuit-against-coinbase-exchange-says-2025-02-21/ [https://perma.cc/7S9X-TB3L]; Matthew Goldstein, S.E.C. Drops Lawsuit Against Binance, a Crypto Exchange, N.Y. Times (May 29, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/29/business/sec-binance-lawsuit-dropped.html [https://perma.cc/4KRS-7CX4]; Mrinmay Dey, SEC Agrees to Dismiss Case Over Crypto Lending by Winklevoss’ Gemini, Reuters (Jan. 26, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/sec-agrees-dismiss-case-over-crypto-lending-by-winklevoss-gemini-2026-01-24/ [https://perma.cc/LA4Y-C76G].
49
See President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, supra note 17, at 45.
50
See Mark Chorazak et al., A Closer Look at the Trump Administration’s Comprehensive Report on Digital Assets, Skadden (Aug. 8, 2025), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2025/08/a-closer-look-at-the-trump-administrations-comprehensive-report-on-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/5EAF-7Z3Q].
51
See id.
52
See Paul S. Atkins, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks at Joint SEC-CFTC Harmonization Event – Project Crypto (Jan. 29, 2026), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/atkins-remarks-joint-sec-cftcharmonization-event-project-crypto-012926 [https://perma.cc/Q7H7-SV3W]; Michael S. Selig, Chair, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, The Next Phase of Project Crypto: Unleashing Innovation for the New Frontier of Finance (Jan. 29, 2026), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaselig1 [https://perma.cc/V47W-AYF4].
53
See Paul Atkins, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The SEC’s Approach to Digital Assets: Inside “Project Crypto” (Nov. 12, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/atkins-111225-secs-approach-digital-assets-inside-project-crypto [https://perma.cc/D4P3-3WPR].
54
Fact Sheet, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Certain Types of Crypto Assets and Certain Transactions Involving Crypto Assets (Mar. 23, 2026), https://www.sec.gov/files/33-11412-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MEM-H46R].
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See id. (“[A] non-security crypto asset becomes subject to an investment contract when an issuer offers it by inducing an investment of money in a common enterprise with representations or promises to undertake essential managerial efforts from which a purchaser would reasonably expect to derive profits.”); Kayvan Sadeghi, Charles D. Riely, & Navjit Sekhon, SEC and CFTC Issue Landmark Joint Interpretation on Crypto Asset Classification, Jenner & Block (Mar. 20, 2026), https://www.jenner.com/en/news-insights/client-alerts/sec-and-cftc-issue-landmark-joint-interpretation-on-crypto-asset-classification [https://perma.cc/PPR4-GUBP].
58
See Fact Sheet, supra note 54.
59
See Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Certain Types of Crypto Assets and Certain Transactions Involving Crypto Assets, 91 Fed. Reg. 13714 (Mar. 23, 2026), 13722; see also Sadeghi, Riely, & Sekhon, supra note 57.
60
See Atkins, supra note 53.
61
See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. 2025-42, SEC Announces Cyber and Emerging Technologies Unit to Protect Retail Investors (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025-42 [https://perma.cc/Q39B-DWE7].
62
See Emily Ekshian, Inside Washington’s Strategic Overhaul of Crypto Policy in 2025, Crypto Council for Innovation (June 14, 2025), https://cryptoforinnovation.org/inside-washingtons-strategic-overhaul-of-crypto-policy-in-2025/ [https://perma.cc/FD4H-AC4T].
63
See Grewal, supra note 15, at 487.
64
See Tonantzin Carmona, Protecting the American Public from Crypto Cisks and Harms, Brookings (June 2, 2025), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protecting-the-american-public-from-crypto-risks-and-harms/ [https://perma.cc/8FQL-K9SW].
65
See generally Joseph Jasperse, Stevens Ctr. for Innovation Fin.,50-State Review of Cryptocurrency and Blockchain (Feb. 2023), https://stevenscenter.wharton.upenn.edu/publications-50-state-review [https://perma.cc/9ESD-7FT5] (detailing different regulations in each state).
66
See Andrew K. Jennings, State Securities Enforcement, 47 BYU L. Rev. 67, 99 (2021).
67
Id. at 85; Att’y Gen. All., supra note 13, at 8 (noting that Delaware, New York, South Carolina, Maryland, and New Jersey give the AG or a securities regulator within the AG’s office “original jurisdiction for enforcing state securities laws.”).
68
Att’y Gen. All., supra note 13, at 8.
69
See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 517.191(11) (West 2024); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-51-603.5(1) (West 2025).
70
Jennings, supra note 66, at 69.
71
Id. at 75.
72
See id. at 69, 79–82 (discussing state enforcement, including state registration violations).
73
See id. at 73–74.
74
See, e.g., Christopher Oster & Tom Lauricella, Janus Agrees to a Settlement of $226 Million, Wall St. J. (Apr. 28, 2004), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108309380536794940 (detailing a settlement between an investment firm, the SEC, and state regulators).
75
See Jennings, supra note 66, at 103, 119–21 (discussing tip referrals and information sharing, but noting that such coordination is often limited and fragmented).
76
See id. at 75, 90.
77
Id. at 82, 89 (quoting The Role of State Securities Regulators in Protecting Investors: Hearing on Efforts to Enforce Securities Laws, Investment Advisor Registration and Licensing, State Investigations into Mutual Fund Industry Abuses, and Investor Education Programs Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affs., 108th Cong. 34 (2004) (statement of Ralph A. Lambiase, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n)).
78
See id. at 74, 91–94.
79
N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, 2024 Enforcement Report 6 (2024), https://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FINAL_2024-Enforcement-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY9S-L8V6] (reporting “37 enforcement actions involving digital asset staking and 155 enforcement actions involving other digital assets” in 2023); N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, 2025 Enforcement Report 19 (2025), https://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/2025-NASAA-Enforcement-Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/S25K-AUDD] (indicating that states brought “more than 120 [digital asset-related] enforcement actions” in 2024); Ralhi, supra note 34.
80
See Jennings, supra note 66, at 130–31.
81
See N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, 2025 Enforcement Report, supra note 79, at 8.
82
See Ro Spaziani et al., Update on the U.S. Digital Assets Regulatory Framework – Market Structure, Banking, Payments, and Taxation, Gibson Dunn (Aug. 5, 2025), https://www.gibsondunn.com/update-on-the-us-digital-assets-regulatory-framework-market-structure-banking-payments-and-taxation/ [https://perma.cc/8MHN-KQDC] (noting preemptive effects related to “registration or qualification requirements on offers or sales of” digital commodities and activities of “registered digital commodity exchanges, digital commodity brokers, and digital commodity dealers . . . subject to the Commodity Exchange Act”); Letter from Leslie M. Van Buskirk, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, to Sen. Tim Scott, Chair, & Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs. 5 (Aug. 5, 2025), https://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/NASAA-Urges-Congress-to-Protect-Investment-Contract-Law-and-Pass-the-Support-Anti-Fraud-Enforcement-Act-8.5.25-F.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H7W-SMLA] (expressing concern that new legislation could be read to “prohibit[], limit[], or otherwise restrict[] [non-federal securities administrators’] ability to bring administrative, civil, or criminal anti-fraud enforcement actions under or consistent with present state or federal securities or commodities laws” and urging the adoption of language in the Clarity Act or elsewhere that would make it “abundantly clear” that the legislation does not have such preemptive effect).
83
See President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, supra note 17, at 55.
84
See Jennings, supra note 66, at 84–85.
85
Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Secures Settlement Worth $2 Billion from Crypto Firm Genesis Global Capital for Defrauded Victims (May 20, 2024), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2024/attorney-general-james-secures-settlement-worth-2-billion-crypto-firm-genesis [https://perma.cc/A8CD-2MXG] [hereinafter Genesis Settlement Press Release].
86
Most notably, the New York State Department of Financial Services requires digital asset firms to obtain a BitLicense or a state banking charter before engaging in virtual currency-related commercial activities with New Yorkers. See generally Virtual Currency Businesses, N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs. , https://www.dfs.ny.gov/virtual_currency_businesses [https://perma.cc/46KF-UPK7] (last visited Mar. 8, 2026).
87
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352-c(1), 353 (McKinney 2025).
88
N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(12) (McKinney 2025).
89
See State v. Rachmani Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 718, 725 n.6 (N.Y. 1988); People ex rel. Schneiderman v. Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC, 107 N.E.3d 515, 520 (N.Y. 2018) (citations omitted); People ex rel. Cuomo v. Greenberg, No. 401720/05, 2010 WL 4732745, at *35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010), aff’d as modified, 946 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (“Proof of actual damages, injury or reliance are not a required element for liability to accrue under the Martin Act.”).
90
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352(2)–(4), 354 (McKinney 2025); see also James v. iFinex Inc., 127 N.Y.S.3d 456, 463–64 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) (discussing NYAG’s power pursuant to Martin Act § 352 and § 354).
91
See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352(1), 359-e(14)(a)(i) (McKinney 2025); see also iFinex, 127 N.Y.S.3d at 461 (explaining that the Martin Act’s definition of commodities is expansive enough to include cryptocurrencies).
92
See All Seasons Resorts, Inc. v. Abrams, 497 N.E.2d 33, 36, 39 (N.Y. 1986)).
93
See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
94
See In Matter of Waldstein, 160 Misc. 763, 767 (Sup. Ct. Albany County Oct. 22, 1936); People v. Van Zandt, 43 Misc. 3d 563, 573, 981 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014); Xerox Corp. v. New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal, 973 N.Y.S.2d 458, 643 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); see also People ex rel. James v. Mashinsky, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 50826(U), *7 n.7 (Sup. Ct. 2023) (internal citations omitted) (“It is ultimately unclear whether the Waldstein approach is still accepted in this state after the First Meridian decision . . . Assuming, without deciding, that the Waldstein test is an accepted approach, the EIAs satisfy this test because the EIAs allowed Celsius to finance the collateralized loans it offered as part of its profit-generating efforts”).
95
See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 359-e (McKinney 2025); People ex rel. James v. Mashinsky, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 50826(U), *15 (Sup. Ct. 2023) (explaining details).
96
See People ex rel. Schneiderman v. Greenberg, 54 N.E.3d 74, 77 (N.Y. 2016); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 353(3) (McKinney 2025).
97
See, e.g., Mashinsky, slip op. at *16 (citing People ex rel. Cuomo v. Greenberg, 946 N.Y.S.2d 1, 8–9 (App. Div. 2012), aff’d, 994 N.E.2d 838 (N.Y. 2013)) (other citations omitted).
98
See N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(12) (McKinney 2025); see also Ben Protess, William K. Rashbaum, & Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Trump Is Battling a New York Law Used to Take on Corporate Giants, N.Y. Times (Sept. 23, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/23/nyregion/donald-trump-letitia-james-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/6JQ8-FLWH].
99
See James v. iFinex Inc., 127 N.Y.S.3d 456, 459–61 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).
100
Id. at 459.
101
Id. at 460.
102
See id.
103
See id. at 460–61.
104
See Michael del Castillo, New York Court Approves Investigation Into $10 Billion Cryptocurrency Created by a Presidential Candidate, Forbes (July 9, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2020/07/09/ny-supreme-court-approves-investigation-into-10-billion-cryptocurrency-created-by-a-presidential-candidate/ [https://perma.cc/5CX7-J9ME] (reporting statement by AG James); Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Ends Virtual Currency Trading Platform Bitfinex’s Illegal Activities in New York (Feb. 23, 2021), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021/attorney-general-james-ends-virtual-currency-trading-platform-bitfinexs-illegal [https://perma.cc/ET5H-G4Y6].
105
People ex rel. James v. Mashinsky, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 50826(U), *1-2 (Sup. Ct. 2023).
106
See id. at *1–4.
107
See id. at *4–5, *18; Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Sues Former CEO of Celsius Cryptocurrency Platform for Defrauding Investors (Jan. 5, 2023), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2023/attorney-general-james-sues-former-ceo-celsius-cryptocurrency-platform-defrauding [https://perma.cc/KN7J-67DA].
108
Mashinsky, slip op. at *9 (citing James v iFinex Inc., 127 N.Y.S.3d 456, 461 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)).
109
See id. at *6–9.
110
See id. at *12–14.
111
See id. at *14.
112
See id. at *14–16.
113
Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Sues Cryptocurrency Companies Gemini, Genesis, and DCG for Defrauding Investors (Oct. 19, 2023), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2023/attorney-general-james-sues-cryptocurrency-companies-gemini-genesis-and-dcg [https://perma.cc/T63X-R2RW].
114
See id.
115
See id.
116
See id.
117
Genesis Settlement Press Release, supra note 85.
118
Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Recovers $50 Million from Crypto Firm Gemini for Defrauded Investors (June 14, 2024), https://on.ny.gov/4c6GsDM [https://perma.cc/7DC3-N79P] [hereinafter Gemini Settlement].
119
Genesis Settlement Press Release, supra note 85.
120
Gemini Settlement, supra note 118.
121
Cf. Protess, Rashbaum, & O’Brien, supra note 98 (explaining how the threat of disgorgement highly incentivizes settlements).
122
See Att’y Gen. All. , supra note 13, at 7.
123
See Carolyn Carter, National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Protection in the States 11 (2018), https://www.nclc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/UDAP_rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/THG6-EB42].
124
See Daniel R. Suvor et al., State UDAP Enforcement Poses New Risk for Crypto Companies, O’Melveny & Myers LLP (Jan. 27, 2023), https://www.omm.com/insights/alerts-publications/state-udap-enforcement-poses-new-risk-for-crypto-companies/ [https://perma.cc/JA88-B2VX ].
125
See Carter, supra note 123, app. C at 65–67, https://www.nclc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/udap-appC-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6L4-Y7Z9]; Protess, Rashbaum, & O’Brien, supra note 98 (covering disgorgement leverage).
126
Benjamin Cooper, Analysis: Treating Crypto Fraud as Consumer Scam Gains Traction, Bloomberg L. (Dec. 1, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-treating-crypto-fraud-as-consumer-scam-gains-traction [https://perma.cc/9QG4-RMNV].
127
Elysa M. Dishman, Class Action Squared: Multistate Actions and Agency Dilemmas, 96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 291, 304–05 (2020).
128
See id. at 303–08.
129
Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James and Multistate Coalition Secure $24 Million from Cryptocurrency Platform Nexo for Operating Illegally (Jan. 19, 2023), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2023/attorney-general-james-and-multistate-coalition-secure-24-million-cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/T558-HEQR].
130
Elysa M. Dishman, Enforcement Piggybacking and Multistate Actions, 2019 BYU L. Rev. 421, 429–30 (2020).
131
See Alan Suderman, How an Emboldened Crypto Industry is Trying to Cement Political Influence, PBS News (Feb. 17, 2025), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/how-an-emboldened-crypto-industry-is-trying-to-cement-political-influence [https://perma.cc/L3T4-GY6K]; Protess, supra note 18.
132
Ben Protess and Sharon LaFraniere, S.E.C. Drops Case Against Cryptocurrency Firm Founded by Winklevoss Twins, N.Y. Times (Jan. 23, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/23/us/politics/sec-crypto-winklevoss.html [https://perma.cc/PX7Q-GVCX].
133
Id.
134
See Mark Miller, State Attorneys General, Political Lawsuits, and Their Collective Voice in the Inter-Institutional Constitutional Dialogue, 48 Notre Dame J. Legis. 1, 19–20 (2022).
135
See id. at 24–25.
136
See Michael J. Myers & Turner Smith, “Special Solicitude” or “Special Hostility?:” Where State Standing in Environmental Litigation Stands 17 Years After Massachusetts v. EPA, 42 UCLA J. Env’t L. & Pol’y 207, 221, 235 (2024).
137
See id. at 235.
138
See George R. Lynch, Privacy Wins, No Matter Who Claims California Senate Seat, Bloomberg L. (July 28, 2016), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglawnews/bloomberg-law-news/X6SNADMG000000 [https://perma.cc/RTQ7-P7QE].
139
See Ina Jaffe, Older Workers Find Age Discrimination Built Right into Some Job Websites, NPR (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/28/521771515/older-workers-find-age-discrimination-built-right-into-some-job-sites [https://perma.cc/3PLL-F6WJ].
140
See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Warns Investors About ‘Extreme Risk’ When Investing in Cryptocurrency, Issues Additional Warning to Those Facilitating Trading of Virtual Currencies (Mar. 1, 2021), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021/attorney-general-james-warns-investors-about-extreme-risk-when-investing [https://perma.cc/UDH3-N5CS].
141
Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Proposes Nation-Leading Regulations on Cryptocurrency Industry (May 5, 2023), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2023/attorney-general-james-proposes-nation-leading-regulations-cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/U2NP-LUXT].
142
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.